Abstract. In this paper, we deal with the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium for a generalized convex game. Each player is associated with a convex cost function and multiple shared constraints. Supposing that each player can exchange information with its neighbors via a connected undirected graph, the objective of this paper is to design a Nash equilibrium seeking law such that each agent minimizes its objective function in a distributed way. Consensus and singular perturbation theories are used to prove the stability of the system. A numerical example is given to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
Introduction
How to find a Nash equilibrium is an interesting and important problem for non-cooperative games [1] . In [2] , an iterative steepest descent algorithm was proposed for numerical approximation of local Nash equilibria. In [3] , an adaptive learning technique was used to iteratively compute the Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game. Extremum seeking based methods were proposed to search Nash equilibrium [4] [5] [6] .
Compared with the conventional Nash equilibrium problem, the generalized Nash games assume that each player's feasible set can be constrained by the rival players' strategies [7] [8] [9] . A generalized convex game usually has continuous strategy spaces and the actions are coupled through both objective functions and constraints. The problem was first formally proposed by [10] , followed by [11] studying economic equilibria. Since then, there have been many studies reported on the existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium, and algorithms to compute it. For instance, a method involving variational inequalities was presented in [12] .
Most of the aforementioned literature require that each player can obtain the strategies of its opponents. In practice, especially in some multi-agent networks, the agent might have limited interaction (communication) with other agents. Recently, distributed computation algorithms have attracted much attention due to their reliability, security and low communication burden. For example, [13] [14] [15] [16] addressed the distributed optimization problem using saddle point dynamics methods and [17] investigated a distributed time-varying optimization problem for quadratic objective functions. The recently proposed algorithm in [18] solved a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for unconstrained non-cooperative games based on average consensus and singular perturbation theory. In [19] , discrete-time adaptive algorithms were presented to solve Nash equilibrium seeking problems, the objectives and constraints are required to be neighbor-coupled.
In this paper, we present a continuous-time distributed algorithm to seek a Nash equilibrium for a generalized convex game with shared constraints. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1) A distributed algorithm to find the normalized Nash equilibrium of a [18] , constraints relying on other players' strategies are considered. Compared with [19] , the objective functions and constraints can be coupled arbitrarily; 2) The convergence of the players actions to the normalized Nash equilibrium is analyzed, by using singular perturbation based techniques, it is proven that the proposed algorithms converge into a neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium and the error bound can be arbitrarily small by selecting the control parameters.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, notations and background information on graph theory are given. In Section 3, the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem is formulated mathematically. In Section 4, a distributed algorithm is designed, and convergence analysis is given. Section 5 gives a numerical example to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Notations and Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, R ( 
Problem Formulation
x R is the action vector of N players. Suppose that each player is subject to k shared constraints that depend on the players' actions, i.e., ( ) 0,
j is not a neighbor of agent i , then player i has no access to player j 's action directly. Otherwise, player i can get the information of player j via a connected undirected graph topology. Our objective is to design a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking law for the players such that their actions converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game.
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Furthermore, the Slater's conditions hold.
Distributed Generalized Nash Equilibrium Seeking Law Design and Convergence Analysis
In this section, we aim to find a Nash equilibrium of a generalized convex game, where the objective functions satisfy the following assumption. 
Existence and Uniqueness of the Normalized Nash Equilibrium
Under Assumptions 1-3, the players' optimization problems are convex and Nash equilibria exist [7] .
Moreover, a point 1 ,,
R is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if the following KKT conditions hold for all  i V and some 0,
Usually, the problem in (1) has multiple Nash equilibria. In this paper, we do not assume the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Instead, we consider a special kind of Nash equilibrium, namely the normalized equilibrium point [7] , which is defined according to the KKT condition (2) , such that Before presenting the algorithm, we show that under some assumptions, the normalized Nash equilibrium satisfying (3) exists and is unique. Firstly, we introduce the concept of monotonicity for a single-valued mapping :  NN F R R . Definition 1 (On monotonicity of a single-valued mapping) [19] (1) 
Assumption 4 [7] The function The following assumption will be used in the stability analysis. 
Control Design and Stability Analysis
We now propose a distributed control law using the estimation of neighboring actions. Let Based on (4), the updating law for play i is designed as
where player 1 is selected to calculate the common multipliers 1  j and consensus based control laws are used to broadcast them to all the other players. In ( (4) and (5) uses leader-following consensus to estimate unknown information and saddle point dynamics to achieve convergence. In the following analysis, we use singular perturbation theory to prove the stability of the system. First, an auxiliary system is designed. Then, based on the stability of this auxiliary system, we prove the convergence of the original system using Lyapunov based methods. (4) and (5) as:
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The following theorem presents the main result of this section. (4) and (5) 
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold and let
, define a Lyapunov candidate function as 
is the point satisfying (3). Taking the derivative of V along (7), we have 
For notational convenience, ˆ  
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where 15 ,, ll are some positive constants. Let (4) and (5) be the updating law. Fig. 2 shows the simulation result of the estimate on the optimal solutions 12 ( ), ( ),

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Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems for generalized convex games with multiple shared constraints. Supposing that each player can exchange information with its neighbors via a connected undirected graph, continuous-time control laws were designed such that each player minimizes its own cost function in a distributed way. In future, we will consider distributed continuous-time Nash equilibrium seeking for nonsmooth objective functions with convergence analysis. In addition, we will relax the assumptions used in the paper.
